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On How to Refer to Unobservable Entities 
 
Gregory P. Taylor 
 
In order for us to associate a word with an object it might seem 
that we would need to have direct experience with both. Given the 
present technology, however, there are some objects with which we can 
have no direct experience, namely the unobservable entities postulated 
by scientific theories. The problem taken up here is how to refer to 
those entities. There are two prominent attempts to explain reference in 
scientific theories – the first is Ramsey and Carnap’s proposal that we 
exchange theoretical terms for variables and existential quantification. 
The second is Kripke and Evan’s causal theory of names and rigid 
designation. I will argue that the most plausible theory of reference to 
unobservables lies in between these two theories; terms that purport to 
refer to unobservable entities, when occurring within a theory, need to 
be thought of as bound variables. But when those same terms occur in 
sentences outside of the theory, as when spoken, for example, they 
occur as genuine referring expressions, which have their reference 
determined by a theory.  
 
I. Theories 
I will assume, for now, that it is legitimate to talk about ideal 
reconstructions of theories in which a theory is a set of assertoric 
sentences, to be distinguished from journal articles, textbooks, and the 
research program that revolves around the theory. A theory also needs 
to be distinguished from a scientist’s expression of that theory. In what 
follows, “theory” should be taken to refer to that which both scientists 
and philosophers of science assume when they speak of the 
implications of a theory, of reducing one theory to another, or of a 
theory explaining a phenomenon. (As will become clear later, theories 
as such must exist in order for us to be able to refer to unobservable 
Taylor: On How to Refer to Unobservable Entities 
 
5
entities.) Within the sentences that make up a theory, Carnap 
distinguishes between theoretical and observational sentences.  
Whereas observational sentences contain only terms that refer to 
objects of immediate experience, theoretical sentences contain 
reference to unobservable entities. The two are connected by 
correspondence rules that relate unobservable entities to observable 
ones. An example of such a rule would be: “The temperature of a gas is 
proportional to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules.” Temperature 
is a property with which we are all familiar and which scientists can 
directly measure, whereas the only empirical evidence we can have for 
the mean kinetic energy of a set of molecules is through 
correspondence rules like this one. A theory consists of the theoretical 
and observational sentences plus the correspondence rules.1
II. Ramsey-Carnap Theory of Theoretical Terms 
Imagine that we have a theory with the theoretical terms 
“electron,” “proton,” “atom,” “mass,” and “velocity” (among others 
left out for simplicity). Using Carnap’s construal of a theory, we will 
have a series of theoretical sentences containing these terms, and 
correspondence sentences which contain these terms along with the 
observational terms O1, O2, O3…On. The theory consists of a set of 
sentences, and can be represented in its entirety in the following 
manner: 
(T)…electron…proton…atom…mass…velocity…O1…O2…O3…
On…
The “…” represent the connections between all of these terms (the 
other words), and “electron”…“O3” represent all occurrences of those 
terms in the theory.  We should actually imagine (T) as being the theory 
written out in full – this device has the sole purpose of making those 
terms stand out. 
Ramsey realized that by turning all of the theoretical terms into 
variables and quantifying over the whole theory we get a new set of 
sentences that would have exactly the same predictive and explanatory 
power as (T).2 Substituting “c1” for every occurrence of “electron,” “c2”
1 See Carnap, Rudolf An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science ed. Martin Gardner (New York: Basic 
Books 1966) 225-233 
2 See Ramsey, Frank “Theories” in The Foundations of Mathematics ed. R.B. Braithwaite (London: 
Routledge  1931), 221-236.  The formulation that follows is parasitic on Carnap’s formulation in 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 249-251 
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for “proton,” “c3” for “atom,” “R1” for “mass,” “R2” for “velocity,” 
and then quantifying over the whole theory, we get: 
(R)  c1c2c3R1R2(…c1 … c2… c3 … R1 … R2 … O1 … O2 …
O3…). 
This is called the ramsey-sentence for a theory. The variables, like the 
names in (T), are to be taken as classes of all particular occurrences of 
those variables in the theory, and what (R) does is replace each 
occurrence of a sentence like “mass(electron) = 10” in the theory with 
“there is a c1 and an R1 such that R1(c1) = 10,” while maintaining the 
same structure and non-theoretical terms of the theory.  Where (T) 
would say “electrons have properties x, y, and z,” (R) says “there is a 
thing, and that thing has properties x, y, and z.” The ramsey-sentence 
eliminates all occurrences of theoretical names, while maintaining the 
same assertoric force of the theory.   
Quine would later use a similar device, in attempt to demonstrate 
the superfluity of singular terms altogether: instead of the sentences 
“Socrates is wise” we could say “there is a thing which is both Socrates 
and wise,” thus converting Socrates from a name to a predicate, and 
eliminating reference.3 Like Quine, Ramsey was interested in eliminating 
the problem of reference, and he proposed the ramsey-sentence as a 
means of avoiding using names.  
Unlike Ramsey, though, Carnap was not content to leave things as 
they stand with (R); he wanted to define the reference of theoretical 
terms, not eliminate them. To accomplish this he introduced an analytic-
postulate, which combines the standard expression of a theory, (T), and 
the ramsey-sentence, (R), and forms a conditional: 
(A) c1c2c3R1R2(…c1 … c2… c3 … R1 … R2 … O1 … O2 …
O3…) 
(…electron…proton…atom…mass…velocity…O1…O2…O3)4
This states that if (R) is true, then (T) is true too. What could make (R) 
true is a series of objects that satisfy (R). (The sentence “there is an x 
such that x is green” is satisfied by the objects frog and leaf, but not by 
the objects White House or sun.) If there is a series of objects that satisfy 
(R), then the corresponding theory that uses the theoretical terms 
“electron,” “proton” etc… is also true.   
3 Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 179-187 
4 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 271 
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Carnap’s analytic-postulate fixes the reference for the said 
theoretical terms in the following manner: for (T) to be true the terms 
in it would have to refer (“electrons are x” can’t be true unless there are 
electrons).  If (R) is satisfied (and therefore true), (A) gives a stipulative 
definition of the theoretical terms, by telling us to replace each 
occurrence of “c1” with “electron,” “c2” with “proton,” and so forth.  
(A), then, fixes the reference of the theoretical terms. But since (A) 
stipulates the definition for these terms, “before [(A)] is laid down, these 
terms have no interpretation, not even a partial one. The only 
interpretation they receive in this form of the theory is the partial 
interpretation they obtain through this A-postulate.”5 This entails that if 
(R) is false (not satisfied) then no interpretation is given of the terms, 
because we learn nothing of the truth or falsity of (T). 
(A) is an analytic postulate and all it tells us is that if there is a series 
of objects that satisfy the theory, then the terms in the theory refer to 
those objects. For the empirical content of the theory Carnap suggest 
that we use (R), which he calls the synthetic postulate. The whole 
picture, then, is this: (R) is the portion of the theory with empirical 
content – when we test the theory we are testing (R). What (A) tells us 
is that if (R) is true then the theoretical terms in (T) denote the objects 
that satisfy (R).  (A) makes no empirical claims, because it is a stipulative 
definition. 
Carnap’s entire project here is an attempt to reformulate the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. Quine famously argued that when we test 
(T) we test all of (T), and therefore there is no distinguishing between 
those sentences which can be held true come what may (analytic) and 
those which can’t (synthetic).6 Carnap has found a holistic means of 
defining the terms of the theory so as to get around Quine’s arguments 
(the terms are not defined individually, but the meaning of every term 
in the theory is stipulated at the same time, when (A) is laid down). (T) 
is logically equivalent to (A) and (R), but (A) has no empirical import 
(because it is stipulative).7 And since (A) and (R) are logically 
independent of each-other, when we test the theory we test (R). Thus 
when we get a recalcitrant experience the adjustments will have to take 
place in (R); adjusting (A) could have no predictive consequences.   
5 Ibid, 271 
6 Quine, W.V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
U. Press 1953) 20-46 
7 Quine himself admits in “Two Dogmas” that there is a clear distinction between the analytic and 
the synthetic in the case of stipulation, and this is precisely the “loophole” that Carnap takes 
advantage of; see ibid, 26 
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The new formulation of analyticity produces a new problem, 
though. Carnap’s method can only interpret the terms if the theory is 
satisfied. All old theories become nonsense under this view, and as 
Philip Percival points out, “it is absurd… to suppose that ‘electron’ 
lacks denotation if current theory has the mass of an electron wrong at 
the second decimal place.”8 Perhaps we might try changing “true” to 
“mostly true.” This doesn’t get us anywhere, though. Even if we assume 
that our present theories are mostly true, and that most of the terms 
refer, we have absolutely no way of knowing which. For any term in the 
theory, it might be one of the few that don’t refer. Also, what kind of a 
truth-value is mostly true?  If the antecedent of a conditional is mostly 
true, does that make the consequent true or mostly true? Perhaps we 
could spell it out as saying that most of the sentences are true, but then, 
again, how are we to know which? The point here is not against 
scientific realism – our theories might be “mostly true.” But whether or 
not that is the case, “mostly” truth won’t allow an analytic postulate like 
(A) to fix the reference of theoretical terms, because mostly truth has 
no set implications for a conditional. 
Ramsey argued that we could get along fine without theoretical 
terms; why did Carnap feel compelled to define them?  He says 
something very peculiar about Ramsey’s point:  
Ramsey certainly didn’t mean… that physicists should abandon theoretical terms in their 
speech and writing. To do so would require enormously complicated statements…How can 
the sentence ‘Mass (17) = 5’ [where “17” is the name of a particular object] be translated into 
Ramsey’s language?  ‘R2 (17) = 5’ obviously will not do; it is not even a sentence.9
Well, “R2 (17) = 5” is not our only option; what about “R2(R2 (17) = 
5)”?  Since ‘Mass (17) = 5’ is included in (T), “(R2 (17) = 5)” will occur 
somewhere in (R) as a translation. Carnap rejects “R2 (17) = 5” because 
it is an open sentence, but since it is contained in (R), then “R2(R2 (17) 
= 5)” can be deduced from (R), just as we can deduce “x(Fx)” from 
“x(Fx & Gx).” The reason, I think, why he doesn’t consider this is 
because he infers, from the fact that R2 is a variable, that the translation 
of “Mass(17) = 5” into the ramsey-sentence “must be supplemented by 
the assumptions concerning the relation R2 that are specified in the 
ramsey-sentence.”10 
8 Percival, Philip “Theoretical Terms: Meaning and Reference” in A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Science, 503 
9 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 254 
10 Ibid, 254 
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The argument is that R2 only has significance within (R) as a whole.  
But if we are convinced by Quine’s holistic arguments, we know that 
this is also the case for “Mass.” (Carnap must have found Quine 
convincing – otherwise he wouldn’t have given a holistic reformulation 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the first place).11 Without a 
theory behind it, the term “mass” doesn’t have any more meaning than 
“R2.” Of course “R2(R2 (17) = 5)” will only have meaning in the 
context of the whole theory, but this doesn’t mean that we can’t assert 
it by itself, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to assert “Mass (17) = 5” 
either; in both cases the sentence gets its meaning from the whole 
theory. 
Carnap’s account of theoretical terms (the (A)-postulate) was found 
wanting, because of its requirement that a theory be completely 
satisfied. But he had argued that we must use theoretical terms, and not 
variables, because open sentences tell us nothing and closed sentences 
can only be interpreted within the whole theory. This argument for the 
necessity of theoretical terms fails, because a regular theory, such as (T), 
is every bit as holistic as (R).  If we can understand “Mass(17) = 5” 
then we can understand “R2(R2 (17) = 5).” Therefore Carnap’s 
criticism of Ramsey, that the ramsey-sentence would require 
enormously complex statements, is unfounded, and since we could get 
along just fine with only the ramsey-sentence, Carnap’s analytic 
postulate is unnecessary. 
 
III. Causal Theory of Names and Natural Kinds 
Two things were to be gathered from the last section: Carnap’s 
theory of reference for theoretical terms failed, and we can get along 
just fine without it, using Ramsey’s technique. But that it is possible to 
get along without theoretical terms doesn’t entail that we actually do.  
Scientific theories don’t seem to be either ramsey-sentences or 
nonsense, and so an account of theoretical terms is still needed. 
Fortunately, Carnap’s theory of theoretical terms is not the only one 
available. 
11 He says of Quine and his new formulation: “Earlier, although I did not share the pessimism of 
Quine…, I always admitted that it was a serious problem and that I could not see a satisfactory 
solution… Finally, after many years of searching, I found this new approach, with the new A-
postulate.” An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 273-274.  Carnap is not convinced by Quine’s 
claim that we can’t distinguish between analytic and synthetic, but rather that any attempt to do so 
must be both holistic and stipulative. 
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Kripke proposed the causal theory of names in the following 
passage from Naming and Necessity:
Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name.  They talk about 
him to their friends.  Other people meet him.  Through various sorts of talk the name is 
spread from link to link as if by a chain.  A speaker who is on the far end of the chain, who 
has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to 
Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or 
from whom he ever heard of Feynman.12 
When Feynman was born his parents named him and initiated a 
practice of using that name to refer to their son. Thus, if I say “Kripke 
told me that Richard Feynman was a physicist” I am participating in the 
social practice of referring to Richard Feynman (and Kripke).  
Regardless of what information I have about him, and regardless of 
whether or not that information is correct (suppose Kripke was 
mistaken when he said that Feynman was a physicist), I am referring to 
the person for whom the social practice was initiated. Indeed, we could 
only discover that what we said about a person was wrong if we actually 
referred to that person. 
Kripke treats natural kinds the same way. Take gold, for example. 
“Suppose there were an optical illusion [due to the peculiar properties 
of the atmosphere] which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, 
in fact, once the peculiar properties were removed, we would see that it 
is actually blue.”13 Would we say in this case that gold didn’t exist?  
Kripke says no – we would say that gold is actually blue. The word 
“gold” refers to that stuff, whatever it actually is, in the presence of 
which we commonly say “gold.” (Think of Berkeley – he claimed that 
chairs are just ideas in our heads and not material objects; he did not 
say that chairs don’t exist.) 
Gareth Evans developed Kripke’s brilliant insights into a full-
fledged theory of reference. 14 As he sees it, the reference of a proper 
name is determined like this: a person is given a name (either at birth or 
later, as with a nickname) and there is a core group of people who 
frequently interact with her. They call her by that name, both in and out 
of her presence. Evans calls these people producers. Other people, who 
have never met her, may nonetheless pick up her name by hearing 
12 Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press 1972), 91 
13 Ibid, 118 
14 Evans, Gareth The Varieties of Reference ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford U. Press 1982).  
Hilary Putnam did much the same thing, even anticipating Kripke on some points.  See Putnam, 
Hilary “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in Mind, Language, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press 
1975), 215-271 
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somebody use it or by being given a description about her (among 
other things). These people are called consumers. The essential condition 
for being a consumer is that one is not able to gather and spread any 
information about the person that was not already involved in the 
social practice of referring to that person; to do so is to become a 
producer.15 The situation with natural kinds is almost identical.16 
Though just about everybody interacts with a certain species of plant, 
for example, they are not all necessarily producers. The real producers 
are those who can tell us what constitutes that plant, and distinguish it 
from other kinds of plants; we call these people “botanists.”   
It seems at first glance that this theory of names and natural kinds 
works perfectly for scientific language. Consider a term like “quark.” 
Most people don’t ever have anything to do (consciously) with a quark 
in their entire life.  Nonetheless we are all able to refer to quarks. I just 
did, and the causal theory seems to provide an explanation of how it 
was possible. Scientists who actually interact with quarks publish 
articles about them, refer to them in class, and talk about them to their 
friends. All of the people who come into contact with the word 
“quark” in these ways are consumers, and they are thus able to refer to 
quarks, even though they (myself included) couldn’t tell you the first 
thing about a quark. If asked what I mean by “quark,” I would reply, “a 
particle or something; ask a physicist.”   
The causal theory does, indeed, provide a satisfactory explanation 
for most cases of reference. But as I will argue in the concluding 
section, closer examination of terms such as “quark” reveals an 
important difference between terms for observable and unobservable 
entities, a difference which necessitates two separate accounts of 
reference. 
 
IV. The Reference of Theoretical Terms 
To see the distinction, imagine that I’ve been hearing scratches in 
my walls and the pitter patter of little feet at night.  I would infer that a 
mouse is living in my apartment. 17 Think of this as a scientific theory. I 
can go about testing it: I make the prediction that if I leave a piece of 
cheese on the floor when I go to bed it will be gone when I wake up. 
The situation here is similar to the situation with unobservable entities, 
15 The Varieties of Reference, 376-377 
16 Ibid, 382-383 
17 The example is from Van Fraasen, Bas C. “Concerning Scientific Realism” in Philosophy of Science 
ed. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 1998), 1076 
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like quarks and electrons. Scientists make some observations and realize 
that there are some for which we can’t account, given the present 
ontology, and so they postulate a new entity. When they want to go 
about testing their hypothesized entity they have to deduce, using the 
theory, further consequences that it will have for observation.   
Suppose that I had named the elusive mouse Frank, and that I then 
proceeded to talk about him to my friends (“Frank kept me up all 
night”). The causal theory would hold that I am a producer for the 
practice of using “Frank” to refer to that mouse, and that the people 
who hear me talking about Frank are the consumers. If one of my 
friends were to say to another “I hope Greg catches Frank,” they would 
be referring to the mouse in my apartment, even if they haven’t had any 
contact with it.   
The difference between the present example and a normal name, 
like Richard Feynman, is that here we have a name that isn’t given an 
ostensive baptism, but rather is fixed by description. There is no 
previous object that we now call Frank; “Frank” refers to whichever 
object it is that is scratching, pitter pattering, and eating my cheese.  
There are many names that function like this: Jack-the-Ripper and 
Deep-throat, for example.18 Whoever committed the infamous 
murders, and whoever was the Watergate informant, are the people to 
whom these names refer. This is exactly what is happening with an 
unobservable entity in a scientific theory: the theory is not saying 
“those things we call electrons have these properties,” but rather, 
“there is a thing that has these properties – call it an electron.” Before 
the theory comes along we have no knowledge of the properties or 
even the existence of those things. All unobservable entities are 
introduced this way – via description, not ostension. Otherwise they 
wouldn’t be unobservable. 
Every theoretical term must, at some point, have been introduced 
and had its reference fixed by a theory. We can then go about using 
that term to refer to the entity postulated by the theory. But the theory 
itself does not refer; it sets the rules for referring.  According to Kripke, 
most people are given names in an initial “baptism” of sorts. When 
somebody says of their newborn “we will call him Jones” they are not 
referring to Jones, they refer to the boy with the word “him” and name 
him Jones – fixing the name, not using it. In the introduction of an 
unobservable entity, though, there is nothing to do the work that the 
18 The Varieties of Reference, 47-48.  For names like this Evans uses what he calls the “the quantifier,” 
as in: the person such that that person committed murders x, y, and z. 
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word “him” did in Jones’ baptism. When the theory of quantum 
mechanics tells us about electrons it can not refer to electrons and then 
say something about it. The theory tells us what electrons are and tells 
us how to go about referring to them in the future – baptism by theory.  
If these considerations are correct we should actually think of the 
theory expressed by (T) as looking like this: 
(TR)  electron  proton…(…electron … proton … O1 … O2 …
O3…), 
which represents the implicit quantification of the name-fixing 
descriptions. 
Concerning observable entities theories can refer just fine. When 
chemistry tells us that water is H2O, we already know what water is.  In 
this case the reference is not being fixed by a description. If we were to 
adopt a new theory of chemistry in which water is XYZ, we could still 
say that both theories were telling us the chemical composition of water,
and therefore they are referring to the same thing. Kripke argued that 
even if everything we think about tigers turns out to be wrong, “tiger” 
will always refer to tigers (be they animals, machines, or holograms).  
This is crucial for Kripke’s conception of a name; it is his concept of 
rigid designation – reference across possible worlds.19 But it isn’t clear 
that the same is the case with an unobservable entity. Take away 
everything we think electrons are and there is nothing left to point to 
and say “we were wrong about that.”   
The causal theory of names explains quite well how a lay-person 
can use theoretical terms. But whereas the producers for a normal 
object can perceive the object, the producers for an unobservable (the 
scientists) can only detect the effects of the object, through the use of a 
theory.  This distinction is incredibly important, because it yields the 
distinction between ostension and description. We can point to a tiger 
and say “tiger,” but before a theory has fixed the reference for the term 
“electron,” we can only say “that which is causing the streak in the 
cloud chamber.”  (“That which,” not “that.”) Of course now we can 
say the word “electron,” with meaning, but only because a theory has 
already determined that we should call that which causes the streak an 
electron. 
Without the theory of quantum mechanics scientists simply have 
no interaction with electrons. (Unobservables are the noumena and the 
theory is the form that we bring to experience, so to speak.) It follows 
19 Naming and Necessity 48-49 
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that the theory, qua ramsey-sentence, must have existed prior to the 
beginning of the name-using practice. A name acquires its referent 
through the behavior of a group of producers, but because the 
scientists can only produce after the theory exists, the theory can not be 
participating in the name using practice. Theories do not refer to 
unobservable entities; unobservable entities satisfy theories, and then we 
can refer to those entities. Likewise, theoretical terms for unobservable 
entities refer to objects when spoken by a scientist or lay-person, but 
function as implicitly quantified bound variables when occurring within 
a theory.   
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